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Behavioral Life-Cycle Models Under Alternative Demographic
Regimes
1. Introduction
Social security in the United States will encounter financial strains due to an
aging population. The decreasing worker to retiree ratio will reduce retirement benefits
relative to today’s benefits so long as the tax rate and eligibility age are not altered.
Policy makers assume that they should make policies to maintain the current benefit
levels.
In contrast to this assumption, this paper does not presume that policy makers
should preserve current benefits. An analysis of the required tax rate to maintain lifetime
utility across the current and future demographic regimes is undertaken rather than just a
calculation of the tax rate needed to maintain present benefits. A comparison of lifecycle consumption models across the present and future demographic regimes shows that
the tax rate should actually decrease 2-6 percentage points in order to equate lifetime
utility. This result is opposite of the prescribed tax increase to maintain retirement
benefits. This finding holds with varying assumptions of intertemporal decision making
including exponential discounting (as in standard life-cycle models), hyperbolic
discounting (as in Laibson, 1997), and short planning horizons (as in Caliendo &
Aadland, 2006).
This counter-intuitive result is driven by the inability of a social security program
(with a below market internal rate of return) to improve welfare for the models mentioned
above under the present demographic regime (Caliendo (2011), Findley and Caliendo
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(2008))1. The future demographic regime only reduces the internal rate of return and thus
makes the program less advantageous. Therefore, in order to maintain utility across
regimes, the pension program must be reduced.
2. Social Security Structure and Justification
The United States social security program represents the largest government
transfer program in the world. In 2011 social security provided benefits to 55 million
people and spent $736 billion (The Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 2012, p. 2). What are
the justifications for such an extensive retirement program? Justification of the program
on grounds of redistribution of wealth, market failures/inefficiencies, and paternalism
will be addressed.
2.1 Redistribution of Wealth
One justification given for social security is that the program acts as a form of
redistribution. Social security can act on both an individual level, because of the
progressive nature of the benefit system, and on a generational level. Whenever the
social security program stores excess income over costs, an implied redistribution of
wealth occurs (Diamond, 1977, p. 278-279). Additionally, whenever the government
increases benefits an indirect intergenerational transfer occurs (Blinder, 1988, p. 25).
This transfer can be suitable because earlier generations are poorer on average than the
younger generations throughout their respective life cycles (Diamond, 1977, p. 278-279).
The intergenerational difference can be seen by examining the long run rate of real wage
growth. The social security program itself is not a perfect instrument to accomplish
1

An exception occurs for extremely short planning horizons in the model presented in Findley and
Caliendo (2008). In this case, the findings are reversed.
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societal redistribution goals. It has been pointed out that a more appropriate
redistribution vehicle would not give the wealthier individuals benefits and definitely
would not give them a higher percentage than the poor (Diamond, 1977, p. 279). Also,
the intra-generational transfers could be thwarted by the increased longevity of the
wealthy (Bagchi & Findley 2012).
2.2 Market Failure/Inefficiency
Market failure is another commonly used justification for the existence of social
security. Lack of safe long-run investments causes uncertainty regarding income during
retirement. The cost of fully insuring against this risk increases substantially when
uncertainty regarding age of retirement and death are taken into account. If an individual
is forced to retire early due to health complications or even motivation deficiencies, they
can very easily find themselves unprepared for the ensuing years without wage income.
Even comparatively safe investments such as mutual funds are prone to large value
fluctuations (Diamond, 1977, p. 280).
The alleged annuity market failure could exist because of the relatively small
demand for a luxury good. Generally, only those people that expect to live long lives buy
annuities. This adverse selection causes private annuity firms to offer fewer benefits than
the market demands. This problem could be a driving force in the short comings of the
private annuity market, and could therefore provide reasonable justification for a public
annuity program (Blinder, 1988, p. 19).
Additionally, the government has a substantially greater ability to spread and
mitigate risk across generations and individuals than a private annuity firm. Similar to a
private insurance program, the risk of living beyond the scope of retirement savings is
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subsidized by relatively premature deaths of other participants in the program. The
government’s comparative advantage occurs because of compulsory participation, which
eliminates the main difficulty faced by private firms, adverse selection (Blinder, 1988, p.
19).
Furthermore, the government has lower administrative expenses than private
annuity markets, partially due to the scale of the pension program. Even though these
gains could come from large economies of scale, it is more likely a result of non-existent
advertising costs and commissions from the compulsory program (Blinder, 1988, p. 23).
2.3 Paternalism
“There seems to be consensus that social security is primarily justified on grounds
that people do not personally save appropriate amounts because they are shortsighted and
they lack the ability to fully internalize during the working years their consumption needs
for retirement” (Findley & Caliendo, 2008, p. 411).
Paternalistic motivation resulting from myopic behavior is the primary
justification for a public pension program. Blinder defines paternalism as “[k]nowing
that some individuals are too shortsighted, too ill-informed, or simply unwilling to face
reality, the wise and benevolent government makes sure that everyone reaches retirement
age with at least a minimal portion of lifetime earnings left” (Blinder, 1988, p. 28).
Individuals display numerous forms of irrational behavior which could lead to under
saving such as short planning horizons, hyperbolic discounting, rule of thumb savings,
and hand to mouth consumption. These irrationalities could be theoretically countered by
the existence of a public pension program. A “sizable fraction” of the population
displays these impractical behaviors (Diamond, 1977, p. 283).
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This paternalistic approach is not only displayed in the benefits provided, but also
in the structure of the pension program. By legislating an appropriate retirement age for
benefits, the social security program has provided an implicit incentive against premature
retirement and has safeguarded against the corresponding financial deficiencies
(Diamond, 1977, p. 281). Annuitized benefits during the retirement period provide a
supplementary safety net for those that completely deplete private savings during the
retirement period through compulsive spending or risky investments (Blinder, 1988, p.
18).
Even though these paternalistic reasons for social security are valid, the existence
of such a program has corresponding adverse effects. One such example is pension
induced decreased private savings. A third of beneficiaries receive 90 percent of their
retirement income from social security (Diamond & Orszag, 2005, p. 7). This statistic
shows that many individuals think that the government already has an institution in place
to fund their retirement and therefore do not participate in private saving.
Regardless of the public pension program’s shortcomings, it can be assumed that
at least minimal societal improvements occur as a result of the program. However, it
should be noted that diverse government programs would be able to fulfill these functions
in a debatably more appropriate and direct fashion than a public pension program.
3. Future Status of the Social Security Program
The social security program will experience reduction in benefits per retiree due
to changing demographics in the United States. It is projected that the government will
not be able to fully cover scheduled benefits by 2037 when the Old-Age and Survivors
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Insurance and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust fund2 is complete exhausted. This trust
fund consists of the excess benefits over expenses received over the course of the
program and is used to provide benefits when the pension income is insufficient for
benefits. It is further projected that in 2037, the tax income will only be able to cover 76
percent of scheduled benefits. Social security, unlike other government programs, cannot
borrow in order to finance its beneficiaries and therefore will become insolvent by 2037
without benefit reductions or governmental reform (Goss, 2010, p. 112-113).
Insolvency concerns are based largely on the changing demographic of the United
States. As the ratio of workers to retirees decreases, the program is forced in the long run
to decrease benefits without reform. The Board of Trustees estimates the various factors
that are causing this change and projects the long run worker to retiree ratio.
Over the last century, the nation has experienced an increase in life expectancy.
This is in part due to greater accessibility to health care, new and better distributed
medications and immunizations, improved sanitation and food preparation, and other
direct effects from higher GDP and standard of living. The question faced by the
Trustees is to what extent these historical factors will continue to improve and to what
extent will they stagnate. It can be argued that viruses and diseases in general are
becoming more resistant to medications and will cause the life expectancy to decrease.
Conversely, medical research and techniques are rapidly improving. Other factors that
will affect the life expectancy of individuals include the degree of health education, use
of detrimental substances, obesity, pollution, exercise, discovery of new diseases,

2

Although this paper is principally focused on the OASI portion, historical borrowing
between the funds makes assessment of the combined funds pertinent.
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violence, government spending on health care, and several other factors with unknown
magnitudes (Social Security Administration Office of the Chief Actuary, 2012, p. 3).
This great uncertainty about future trends of life expectancy has led demographers
to project life expectancy based on the average historic growth rate. However, there is a
dispute regarding how far back the data should go in order to obtain reasonable
projections. In addition to this, some demographers argue that there is a “cap” on human
longevity whereas others claim that the improvement is potentially limitless (Social
Security Administration Office of the Chief Actuary, 2012, p. 3-4).
Forecasts show that the more fundamental and seemingly permanent decrease in
birth rates is the main driving force of increased costs. Goss stated, “This increase in cost
results from population aging, not because we are living longer, but because birth rates
dropped from three to two children” (Goss, 2010, p. 111). Growth in social security costs
between now until 2030 is almost completely caused by decreased birth rates, and that
only after 2030 the increased life expectancy will have a significant impact (Goss, 2010,
p. 123-124).
There are several practical reasons for this observed decrease in the total fertility
rate (TFR) including changes in social norms, increased female labor force participation,
birth control, postponement of marriage, and other factors. A culmination of all of these
factors has led to a decrease from the current TFR of 2.9 to a long-run (75 years) rate of
2.0 (Social Security Administration Office of the Chief Actuary, 2012, p. 3).
All of these combined factors have direct or indirect effects on the worker to
retiree ratio, which is a main indicator of sustainable benefits. For the OASI portion of
social security, there were 3.6 workers to retiree in 2010 and the intermediate projection
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for 2060 is 2.4 workers to retiree (The Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 2012, p. 53). This
ratio and the effects of different approximations will be analyzed later on.
4. Proposals for reform
This projected decline in benefits has led to many proposals for reform. The
baseline estimate is that policy makers would have to permanently increase payroll tax
from 12.40 percent to 15.01 percent or cut benefits by 16.2 percent in order to be solvent
in the long run (The Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 2012, p. 61). Additionally, more
specialized proposals for structural and parametric reform have been presented.
Diamond and Orszag proposed a plan that involves parametric reform similar to
those presented by the Board of Trustees. They systematically dissect the causes of the
social security crisis and prescribe parametric reform options for each area. They split
the causes into three main categories, improvements in life expectancy, increased
earnings inequality, and the burden of legacy debt (Diamond & Orszag, 2005, p. 1).
The stance is made that major structural reforms mentioned above are not needed
or desired. They argue that incremental parametric reforms can accomplish desired goals
without unreasonable damage to the populace’s wellbeing. They also point out that most
plans for structural change, that includes the use of individual accounts, do not take into
account the need to repay the existing debt, problems of early access to retirement funds,
and uncertainty associated with market investments (Diamond & Orszag, 2005, p. 2-7).
Structural reform in contrast to parametric reform is based on the idea that the
social security program is fundamentally flawed and that minor changes in taxes and
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benefits only produce short term solutions. It is believed that the estimated required tax
increase is underestimated and will require a significantly higher tax for the system to
become solvent. The claim is based on the theory that an increase in tax rate could
actually decrease tax revenue under certain circumstances. This could occur because as
the taxes rise, individuals will choose not to work as much (according to the elasticity of
labor supply) or to accept payment in non taxable forms such as increased benefits.
Consequently, parametric reform is less attractive because of the large requisite tax
increase (Feldstein, 2005, p. 35-36).
One proposal for reform is a plan that integrates the pay-as-you-go system into a
mixed investment system. This system would keep the current taxation and add
government incentivized, personal investments. The government would offer matching
payments for up to a given percent which could potentially vary based on income class
for greater redistributive effects. Over time, the growth of benefits would decrease in
order to compensate for these incentives offered for private savings. (Feldstein, 2005,
p.38).
In contrast to current private investments, the plan would stipulate where
individuals could invest in order to mitigate risk and determine when individuals could
have access to the funds. Recommends restrictions similar 401(k) plans that include
“diversified equity and bond mutual funds” would be implemented (Feldstein, 2005, p.
37-38). Another proposal gives the example of market weighted global index fund of
stocks, bond and real estate in order to ensure diversity of the investments (Kotlikoff
&Sachs, 1998, p. 12).
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One of the major concerns with the restructuring of the public pension program is
the management of existing debt. Feldstein addresses this concern and explains that the
decrease in tax income would initially cause the trust fund balance to decline, but still
remains positive even with scheduled benefit payouts. After the program becomes fully
established, the trust fund will actually grow significantly (Feldstein, 2005, p. 40).
5. Changes in Well-Being Across Alternative Demographic Regimes
A better understanding of the difference between the demographic regimes gives
policy makers the capacity to target certain aspects of the justifications mentioned above.
Paternalistic policies need to take into account specific types of individuals and how they
react to long-run steady state changes. The following analysis will show which type of
representative individual is affected the most and consequently who might need the most
paternalistic intervention. Additionally, the analysis will show what tax policies could be
implemented to achieve a paternalistic goal for the different types of individuals.
In order to gauge the difference across the current and future demographic
regimes on society and some of the effects of parametric reform, three commonly cited
types of consumers will be studied in a life-cycle framework. A fully rational, forwardlooking representative exponential discounter will act as the baseline model. Hyperbolic
discounters will be used to represent a time-inconsistent irrational individual. Lastly, a
representative short term planning horizon individual will be examined in order to gauge
the relevance of foresight. The purpose of this analysis is not to measure or describe
transition dynamics; rather it is to explain the difference between the future and current
demographic regimes.
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5.1 Exponential Discounting
Stability of preferences and consistency of evaluation across time is represented
by exponential discount function. The representative individual is assumed to not give
heed to appetite or impulsive reactions, rather the individual will stick to the same plan
that was developed though a utility maximization problem presented at day one (Ainslie,
2005, p. 635-636). Additionally, the consumer has time-consistent preferences meaning
that the solution to the utility maximization problem at any future point in time is
equivalent to the plan made at the original planning instant.
In this exponential life-cycle model, the individual is assumed to have no
misperceptions or uncertainty about the future. The representative agent perfectly knows
future wages, quantity of benefits, and also retirement and death dates. The individual is
also assumed to have no bequest motive and therefore will exhaust all of his resource by
the time of death. Logarithmic utility will be used to represent the representative
individual’s preferences.
The individual is economically born or enters the work force at
at

, and dies at time

working period,

, retires

̅ . The individual’s only source of income during the
are wages denoted

. For simplicity, the individual is

assumed to earn an economy wide wage that has a constant3 growth rate
given point in time are given by

Wages at a

. The individual receives interest at rate

on all income that is not consumed or put into the individual’s capital stock,

. The

individual pays into the pay-as-you-go social security program at a constant tax rate
during

3

and receives benefits

during the retirement

In reality, the life-cycle income profile is hump shaped rather than monotonically increasing.
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period

̅ . The worker to retiree ratio, , along with the initial wage, wage growth

rate, and interest rate are exogenous. The model will utilize an adjusted worker to retiree
ratio that already takes into account population growth and mortality rates across time.
Therefore, no population growth will be modeled. (A richer model could be constructed
that defines R as the ratio of survivor functions).
In order to gauge the magnitude of the effect of the projected demographic change
on a representative exponential discounter, the Maximum Principle was applied to solve
for the optimal consumption path, followed by the calculation of the compensating
variation. The utility maximization problem is as follows:
Max ∫

T

Subject to the following constraints:

̅
This one stage maximization problem gives equivalent optimal consumption as
the two stage control problem because of the perfect foresight assumptions. After
applying the Maximum Principle, we get the following optimal paths:
(1)

(2)

∫

∫

∫

̅

(3)
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The main metric used to describe the effects of the projected demographic change
is compensating variation. Compensating variation, given by Δ, is the required
percentage change in consumption at every point in time that would cause lifetime utility
to be equivalent across the different demographic regimes. 4 This metric is measured
from the perspective of a planner that discounts utility at a constant social discount rate .
Given the present worker to retiree ratio

, and a future worker to retiree ratio

,

compensating variation is given as follows:
∫

̅



∫

̅



(4)

Solving for:

[

∫

̅



[

]
∫

∫
̅

̅





]

(5)

Using optimal consumption, (2), from the optimization problem and simplifying we get:
(6)
Or equivalently:

(7)

This result shows that the compensating variation is exclusively a function of the
ratio of lifetime wealth in the future to current lifetime wealth.

4

Gahramanov and Findley (2011) study this question for hand-to-mouth consumers.
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5.2 Hyperbolic Discounting Description
Hyperbolic discounters are commonly used as an example of irrationality. This
time-inconsistent discounting is relevant in the study of public pensions because it
characterizes the observed human behavior of impatience in short-term decisions and
patience in long-term decisions which has been used to justify paternalistic intervention.
Unlike the rational exponential discounter, the hyperbolic discounter is
susceptible to realistic appetites, impulses and inconsistent discounting of future events.
The value of a good that is hyperbolically discounted takes on the following form:

The constant is assumed to be one for this paper, and is present to prevent the discounted
value from approaching infinity as the delay approaches zero. As the delay increases, the
discounted value of the good also decreases but at a decreasing rate as seen in Figure 1
(Ainslie, 2005, p. 636). This form of inconsistent discounting causes dynamic
inconsistency, meaning that the individual may reverse previous planned decisions
(Prelec, 2004, p. 512).
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Figure 1
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Hyperbolic discounting implies the “tendency to prefer smaller rewards over
larger ones temporarily, when the smaller reward is imminently available” (Ainslie, 2005,
p. 636).
“In contrast to exponential curves, hyperbolic discount curves depict a strong by
temporary tendency to prefer smaller and sooner (SS) rewards to larger and later (LL)
ones, in the period just before an SS reward is due” (Ainslie, 2005, p. 637). Also,
hyperbolic discount implies that small delays in the present decrease the value of good
proportionately more than small delays in the future (Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto,
Tobacman, & Weinberg, 2001, p. 50).
These realistic characteristics and others have caused the hyperbolic discount
function to better fit choices relative to the exponential discount function in a series of
animal and human experiments. The prevalence of hyperbolic discounting in animal
experiments demonstrates that these tendencies are not a result of societal expectations
(Ainslie, 2005, p. 637).
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A single individual is actually comprised of conflicting and many times
intransitive preferences. “[A]s time elapses these [perceived outcomes of preferences]
shift their relationship with one another from cooperation on a common goal to
competition for mutually exclusive goals” (Ainslie, 2005, p. 637).
The outcome of such competition is a function of the rationalization that occurs,
and the perception of a one-time exception rather than a complete denial of rational
planning. A comparison is drawn between this inner battle/rationalization and a repeated
prisoner’s dilemma bargaining game. In a prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation is contingent
on the belief that a defective act will have negative consequences in future games.
Rationalization allows the individual to believe that a one time “defect” will not have any
effect on the future cooperation of the rational self. However, prevalence of this
rationalization or intertemporal bargaining gives rise to time preference (Ainslie, 2005, p.
642). If people perceive current decisions as indicators of future decisions or if they
evaluate and internalize past moments of indiscretion, these time preference effects
would decrease (Ainslie, 2005, p. 650).
This intertemporal bargaining can be the result of naïve and also rationalized
procrastination. Naïve procrastination is the belief that you will start saving, dieting,
exercising, etc. tomorrow. In reality, the individual will continue to push these activities
to a future date unless some deadline, restriction, or change in environment causes a
change in behavior. Planned or Rationalized procrastination involves an individual that
is fully aware of their future selves and environment. For example, an individual could
put off a task, naively believing that they will do it the next day until they are forced to do
it the last moment before a deadline. A different rational individual, knowing that the
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task will by unpleasant, will plan to do it all on the last day rather than spreading the
dissatisfaction across the entire time frame (Akerlof, 2002, p. 423-424).
Whether it is naïve procrastination, intertemporal bargaining, or rational
procrastination, a hyperbolic discount function is better suited than the time consistent
exponential discount function.
A further shortcoming of exponential discounting is its incapability of reasonably
describing impatience. In order for short-term impatience to be included, the exponential
discounter must discount the future at an extremely unrealistic and implausible rate.
“Hence, exponential discounting is a theory of virtually 100% short term patience.”
Hyperbolic discounting, on the other hand accommodates impatience without
unreasonable long-term impatience (Rabin, 2002, p. 671).
Further evidence in support of hyperbolic discounting is given by the observed
decline in retirement consumption relative to consumption during the working life. This
behavior is hard to explain using an LCPI model, whereas the decline in consumption is
generally observed using a hyperbolic life-cycle model (Akerlof, 2002, p. 424).
A further criticism of the standard models is that economists in general
overestimate the intellectual capacity of the populace. People generally do not solve
utility maximization problems in order to determine consumption let alone directly link
intentions and actions. Also, people seem to “err on the side of instant gratification”
rather than abide to strict plans (Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman, 1998, p. 92-93). (Even
though, the hyperbolic discounter model does involve utility maximization, the timeinconsistency aspect allows for divergence from the original planned consumption path).
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Survey information and societal organizations further establish the existence of
time-inconsistency. There are several surveys where individuals describe themselves to
be intrinsically impulsive rather than forward looking rational planners. Additionally, the
mere existence of organizations that discourage impulsive behaviors such as financial
planning institutions, and Christmas clubs are evidence of impulsive or time-inconsistent
behavior (Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, & Weinberg, 2001, p. 93-94).
Postponement or delay is an example of the infeasibility of exponential
discounting. If an exponential discounter decides to postpone an activity, then it must be
optimal to postpone that activity at a future point in time as well. This implies that any
activity that is postponed will never be done regardless of time elapse, which is not
realistic. Hyperbolic discounting allows for this possibility because of time effects
(Prelec, 2004, p. 513).
To illustrate the applicability of hyperbolic discounting to the analysis of public
pensions, Caliendo (2011) gives the following example:
A naïve hyperbolic consumer standing at date 0 may intend to save part of his
paycheck at date 1 for retirement, but when date 1 arrives he may not follow
through with this plan. Unlike the impatient exponential consumer whose poverty
in old age is all part of a grand plan first concocted when young, the hyperbolic
consumer may unwittingly accumulate a suboptimal nest egg for retirement
(p.668).
The above cited evidence for hyperbolic discounting gives strong intuitive support
at first glance for a public pension program to help with the adverse effects from
impulsive behavior and inadequate savings.
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5.2.1 The Hyperbolic Life-Cycle Model
The hyperbolic discount function is given by
where

is the discount parameter and

is the planning instant. This discount function

is steeper in the short term and flatter in the long term relative to the rational discount
function. This present bias causes time inconsistency and preference reversal over the
life-cycle (Findley & Caliendo, 2008, p. 420).
For any discount function, the growth rate of consumption is independent of
social security. The only effect of social security occurs at time

for a hyperbolic

discounter. The nature of the optimal consumption and capital paths for a hyperbolic
discounter discourage an analytical solution. Therefore, an alternative, equivalent
calculation of compensating variation is defined as follows because of the independence
of the growth rate of consumption and social security (Caliendo, 2011).
(8)
The optimal consumption path for

, derived from the envelope of the

planned consumption at every point in with wage growth evaluated at
(

)

(
̅

Substituting (9) into (8) and simplifying:

̅

is given by:
)
(9)
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[

(

)

(

(

(
Rearranging, solving for

̅

̅

)]

)

(10)

)

and substituting in the initial condition
(

)

(

̅

(

̅

:
)
(11)
)

Or equivalently:

(12)

Hyperbolic discounters have the same solution to the compensating variation as
exponential discounters. The exponential compensating variation is independent of ,
and the hyperbolic compensating variation is independent of . This is not necessarily
intuitive because one could suppose that the time inconsistent hyperbolic individual
would be made worse off because of the myopic behavior or present-bias. However, both
individuals are affected by the same proportional amount because the worker to retiree
ratio only appears in the lifetime endowment of wealth for both the hyperbolic and
exponential discounters after all discounting effects have canceled out.
Given the baseline parameters given in table 1, both hyperbolic and exponential
discounters will experience a 1.80 percent decline in consumption at every point in time
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under the future demographic regime. If the social planner does not discount future
consumption, the compensating variation remains unchanged.
Table 1
Baseline calibration
Parameter name
Date of retirement
Date of death
Real rate of return
Private discount rate
Length of planning horizon
Curvature parameter
Initial capital stock
Initial wage
Income tax
Present worker to retiree ratio
Future worker to retiree ratio
Wage growth
Social Discount rate

Symbol
̅



Value
40
55
0.035
0.035
3
1
0
40,000
0.106
3.6
2.4
0
0.035

In determining the baseline parameters, the board of trustee’s worker to retiree
intermediate projection of 2.4 for the year 2060 was used just taking into account Old
Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI). Also, following the example of other literature,
(Findley & Caliendo, 2009, p. 498) it has been assumed that the individual bears the full
burden of the OASI social security tax.
5.3 Hyperbolic/Exponential Parameter Effects on Compensating Variation
The simple functional form of the compensating variation for exponential and
hyperbolic individuals implies that the compensating variation is invariant to both the
initial wealth as well as the discount rate. The difference between wage growth and the
interest rate does affect the compensating variation. As the absolute value of the
difference between the wage rate and interest rate increases, the compensating variation
decreases. This occurs because the interest rate represents the market rate of return and
the wage rate is directly correlated to the internal rate of return (IRR) of social security
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(Feldstein, 1985, Findley and Caliendo, 2008, p. 416, Goss, 2010, p. 122). Therefore, as
the difference between the interest and wage growth rate increases, the social security
program gets relatively less important to the individual. This results in the need for a
relatively smaller compensation in order to maintain current lifetime consumption levels
in the future demographic regime.
5.4 Policy Implications for Exponential and Hyperbolic Discounters
Policy makers can paternalistically maintain the current level of lifetime utility for
the hyperbolic and exponential consumers through a change in the tax rate.
Mathematically, the policy maker would have to choose a

that minimizes the

compensating variation. For the exponential and hyperbolic discounters, the policy
maker is able to overcome all differences in lifetime utility through a tax change.
Substituting (3) into (7) and setting

gives the analytical problem for the

exponential and hyperbolic discounters:
∫

∫

∫

∫

∫

Integrating and solving for

∫

(13)

̅

:

[

]

Taking the partial derivative with respect to
{

̅

[

][
[

[

̅

]

[

̅

]

(14)

:

̅

]
(

[
̅

̅

)]

]

}
(15)
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Given the baseline parameters and

the partial derivative will be positive.

This implies that the larger the difference between the current and future worker to retiree
ratios, the larger the requisite tax decrease will have to be to make the compensating
variation equal zero. This occurs because as the worker to retiree ratio in the future
regime decreases, the representative individual is made worse off. Any reduction in the
tax rate increases welfare for a hyperbolic or exponential discounter in a pension program
with a negative net present value (Caliendo, 2011, p. 671-673). Therefore a tax reduction
is needed at an increasing amount when the worker to retiree ratio drops.
Using the baseline parameters, the policy maker would have to decrease taxes for
exponential and hyperbolic discounters from 10.6 percent to 8.10 percent to equate
equality across the different demographic regimes. Like the compensating variation, the
required tax change is independent of the policy maker’s discount rate or the personal
discount rate.
5.5 Short Planning Horizon
Individuals have been observed to have planning horizons that are significantly
less than an exponential discounter with perfect foresight. Also, individuals do exhibit
savings and therefore deviate away from the hand-to-mouth consumer model. Short
planning horizons models act as a “compromise” between the two extremes.
Analytically, exponential and hand-to-mouth consumer models are merely limiting cases
of the short planning horizon model (Caliendo & Aadland, 2006, p. 1393). There is also
significant survey data that demonstrates that a large portion of the population displays
planning horizons that are below 10 years (Caliendo & Aadland, 2006, p. 1394-1398).
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In the short planning horizon, an individual only plans for a given time period and
completely discounts any event outside of the planning horizon. This assumption is
advantageous because it implies the commonly observed hump shaped consumption
profile without calibrating adjustments (Caliendo & Aadland, 2006, p. 1393).
For the analysis, this paper will follow the model set up and solutions of Findley
& Caliendo (2009). The model is split up into 4 different phases depending on the events
that are included in the representative individual’s planning horizon.


Phase 1 is



Phase 2 is



Phase 3 is



Phase 4 is ̅

̅
̅

Phase 1 includes the working period before the individual plans for the retirement
period; Phase 2 consists of the rest of the working period where the retirement period is
part of the individual’s planning horizon; Phase 3 includes the retirement period where
the individual cannot see until the death date; and, Phase 4 is the remaining portion of the
retirement period that corresponds to the retirement period where the death date is part of
the planning horizon.
Applying the Maximum Principle and solving for the envelope of the consumption and
capital paths for the four phases, we get the following equations which further allow for
the calculation of compensating variation:
5.5.1 Phase 1
(16)
where
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(17)

(18)

(19)
and
[

]

(20)

5.5.2 Phase 2
[

]
(21)

[

]

where

[

]

[

[

]

[

]

]

(22)

5.5.3 Phase 3
̅

(23)
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where
(24)
and

(25)
̅
5.5.4 Phase 4
{

̅

̅
̅

}
̅

̅

(26)

̅
Compensating variation for this model is defined the same as for exponential discounter:
∫



[

]



∫
̅

∫





∫
̅

∫



[

]
̅

[

]

̅



[

]

(27)



∫
̅

∫

∫



̅

Table 2 presents the results generated in Excel by approximation techniques using
the baseline parameters.
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Table 2

x
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15


-4.53%
-4.30%
-4.07%
-3.84%
-3.62%
-3.42%
-3.23%
-3.07%
-2.93%
-2.81%
-2.71%
-2.61%
-2.53%
-2.46%
-2.40%


-10.35%
-9.89%
-9.38%
-8.83%
-8.26%
-7.72%
-7.21%
-6.76%
-6.36%
-6.00%
-5.68%
-5.39%
-5.14%
-4.90%
-4.69%

Given the baseline parameters, it can be observed that the compensating variation
decreases in magnitude as the planning horizon for the representative agent increases.
This is also true for all discount rates under 7 percent. This result can be explained as
being driven by the agent’s capacity to plan further into the future and mitigate the loss of
utility from the demographic change.
The absolute value of the compensating variation increases significantly when the
social planner does not discount the future. This occurs because the change in
demographic regime only affects the retirement period and the proceeding planning
horizon which is relatively more discounted by a social discounter with 

than

the periods that remain unaffected.
As the planning horizon is pushed out to the entire life span of the representative
individual, the short planning horizon compensating variation will approach the
compensating variation for the exponential discounter. The higher compensating
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variation corresponding to the short planning horizon individual is a result of the concave
utility function and the corresponding utility gains by smoothing consumption.
The wage growth rate/ interest rate relationship that was described in the
hyperbolic/exponential section applies to the short planning horizon model as well.
5.6 Policy Implications for Short Planning Horizons
Policy makers are concerned with the welfare of individuals during the retirement
period, many times at the expense of the working period. Consequently, many of the
proposed reforms involve ways of keeping retirement benefits constant by increasing
taxation. Individuals who follow a short planning horizons model will not initially alter
their consumption profile because of the expectation of lower benefits. They therefore
offer a baseline to study the effects of raising taxation without the smoothing effect
displayed by hyperbolic and exponential discounters.
To equate benefits before and after the demographic change, policy makers would
have to increase taxes to 15.37% [found by solving

. However,

in order to maintain the same life-time utility across the two demographic regimes the tax
rate would have to deviate from this baseline calculation. In order to minimize the
absolute value of the compensating variation the government would alter taxes as
reported in table 3.
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Table 3
x
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

; =0.035
11.42%
10.39%
9.14%
7.60%
5.62%
3.07%
0%
4.24%
5.55%
6.31%
6.82%
7.20%
7.49%
7.71%
7.89%

; =0.035
-4.50%
-4.30%
-3.99%
-3.50%
-2.77%
-1.70%
-0.16%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

; =0
27.71%
27.01%
25.98%
24.62%
22.88%
20.68%
17.90%
14.39%
9.87%
3.92%
0%
0%
0%
1.13%
2.77%

; =0
-0.36%
-1.29%
-2.33%
-3.43%
-4.50%
-5.45%
-6.16%
-6.52%
-6.35%
-5.46%
-3.72%
-2.07%
-0.67%
0%
0%

In contrast to the exponential and hyperbolic models, it is impossible for the
government to achieve a compensating variation equal to zero for individuals with
planning horizons shorter than 8 years using the baseline parameters. This occurs
because individuals with shorter planning horizons benefit from the pensions program
and sufficient value cannot be added through a decrease or increase in taxes. As the
planning horizon increases, the social planner would have to increase taxes to decrease
welfare under the future demographic regime to have a compensating variation equal to
zero.
For the case where the social planner does not discount the future, the tax rate
which minimizes the absolute value of the compensating variation actually exceeds the
baseline tax rate for planning horizons smaller than 9 years. The intuition is that if the
social planner does not discount, the program is more advantageous for individuals with
short planning horizons. Therefore, a higher tax rate (meaning greater implementation of
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the program) provides a higher level of welfare as defined by the social planner. The
slight increase in the tax rate as the planning horizon approaches 15 years is a punitive
action that disallows the future regime from having a higher lifetime utility than the
current demographic regime.
In the case of exponential and hyperbolic discounters where the program (with
negative net present value) is never beneficial, it seems intuitive to let the benefits drop
and not increase taxation. It has been observed that individuals who benefit from social
security now will also benefit under future demographics (Findley & Caliendo, 2009, p.
507). This observation makes it seems reasonable a priori to assume that if the social
security improves lifetime utility for a certain type of individual, such as short planning
horizon agents, that the government should take action to maintain the benefits from the
program through a tax increase.
The model projections show that the baseline compensating variation actually
increases for all planning horizons if the government raises taxes to 15.3% to equate
benefits across the demographic change. In addition, it can be shown that tax reductions
actually decrease, improve, the compensating variation for all planning horizons except
for those with a one year planning horizon assuming the baseline parameters.
Additionally, in the case of individuals with a planning horizon greater than 7
years, a complete discontinuation of the program would not only reduce the
compensating variation, but would make them better off than the individuals under the
current demographic regime.
As would be expected, a decrease in the worker to retiree ratio makes the program
less advantageous for the short planning horizon individual. Therefore, there is evidence
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that participation in the program, or tax rate, should decrease and not increase to keep
benefits constant for individuals who represent short planning horizons.
6. Implications
The equality of the compensating variation for the hyperbolic and exponential
discounter, along with the greater compensating variation for a representative with a short
planning horizon, illustrates that the effect of a change in demographic regimes depends
on the agent’s foresight and not bounded rationality.
7. Conclusion
This paper explores the implications of the United States social security program
under two separate demographic regimes. The compensating variation diverges
significantly depending on the model and the degree of foresight implied therein.
Counter intuitively, it has been shown that irrationality, modeled through hyperbolic
discounting, does not affect the compensating variation. In order to keep lifetime utility
constant between the two demographic regimes, policy makers would have to decrease
taxation for all representative individuals except for those who are currently benefited the
most by the social security program. It has additionally been shown that an increase in
taxes to maintain current benefits only increases the divergence in lifetime utility across
the representative periods.
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